

- 211 Geiger, *op. cit.*, II, Chapters 4 and 5.  
 212 Here we cannot enter into the question of the egoicness of intentive consciousness of the objective; see in contrast, Gurwitsch, *op. cit.*, Chapter II, §7, Chapter III, §19, and Chapter IV, especially §4.  
 213 "In both cases there is a 'consciousness of' directed to something, whereof there is consciousness."  
 214 Schmalenbach, *op. cit.*, §§4 and 5.  
 215 *Ibid.*, pp. 384ff.; see also the controversy with Husserl and Brentano in §9.  
 216 Schmalenbach, *ibid.*, pp. 380f.  
 217 Henri Bergson, *Matière et Mémoire* (Paris, 1896), II, 1 [Bergson, *Oeuvres*, edited by A. Robinet (Paris, 1963), p. 227; Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, translated by Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer (New York, 1959), pp. 65ff.].  
 218 [Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, p. 69.]  
 219 Husserl, *Ideen*, I, §99.  
 220 [Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, p. 68. See also p. 70]: "In truth, it no longer represents our past to us, it acts it; and if it still deserves the name of memory, it is not because it conserves bygone images, but because it prolongs their useful effect into the present moment." (trans. Paul and Palmer)  
 221 See in relation to Bergson's findings with regard to pathology, above, p. 26f., further, also Bergson [pp. 62ff.] for examples from animal psychology.  
 222 Schmalenbach, *op. cit.*, pp. 383 and 420.  
 223 In this connection, see Gurwitsch, *op. cit.*, Chapter II, §§3ff.  
 224 See pp. 73ff.  
 225 Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, §5, p. 15 and §31, p. 143.

## NOTES TO PART III

- 1 With regard to Scheler, see below, pp. 101ff.  
 2 See above, pp. 17 and 32.  
 3 See pp. 71f.  
 4 See Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (Halle, 1927), §16.  
 5 The encounter with fellow human beings in their roles will be discussed below, pp. 107ff.  
 6 In this connection, see Heidegger, *op. cit.*, pp. 117ff.; see further, our considerations above, pp. 71ff.  
 7 See §28.  
 8 See §16.  
 9 In *Das Individuum in der Rolle des Mitmenschen* (München, 1928), §5, Löwith also had these phenomena and connections in mind when he dealt with the "appearance of the world of fellow human beings" in the "surrounding world." But he did not work out sharply enough this coming-into-appearance in its phenomenological peculiarity because he neglected to make the necessary distinctions in the analysis of the phenomena themselves and to fix the phenomena at issue in relation to what is specifically peculiar to them. Above all, what is "co-included" horizontally does not gain acceptance in its own specific characteristic because Löwith, no more than Heidegger, has worked out the distinctions between the different referential phenomena. On that account, Löwith does not exhibit in the phenomenon itself the manner as to how and in which sense the "producing workers belong . . . to the furniture as a work." If, furthermore, "this sort of coming-into-appearance only

incidentally gains acceptance in the utensil, without this itself being shared," while "the furnishings of a room . . . are presented beforehand as human furnishings, as a determinate human environment," then there is present here the difference, likewise unelaborated in its own specific characteristic, between the "being-copresent-nearby" and the "being-held-far-away"—a difference which, as we say, concerns "what is co-included" itself. With respect to its genuine phenomenal meaning, Löwith also does not make expressly clear the shift from the utensil found in use to the producer of the utensil only "co-included" "in the distance": it means a "drawing near" and "becoming co-present" precisely of the producer and his entering into the "co-included" horizon with the one who manipulates the utensil. — Löwith's entire account serves his "anthropological" tendency to conceive the surrounding world as essentially "human" "in the meaning of human surroundings" that properly aim at human beings, their needs and goals, and which can only be understood with respect to human beings (see, e.g., p. 4, "human beings so belong . . . to the world that they essentially determine its characteristic"; p. 39, concerning the "universal determinedness of all 'intramundane' beings . . . by human beings existing in the world . . ."). The "coming-to-the-fore" of the user, the producer, etc., in a finished utensil does not legitimate, however, a preeminent place of man in the world: the user appears in the furniture in precisely the same way corn appears in the granary, livestock in the barn, the bird in the nest, etc. The thesis of Löwith even contradicts the account in the text of the "interwovenness" of the world of fellow human beings and the surrounding world. This is not the place for a radical critical discussion of the anthropologism which, beginning with Heidegger, has found an accepted entry into contemporary philosophy; it must still be observed that it is only by forcing the phenomena in consequence of this tendency that it is said that a chair cannot touch the wall because "the presupposition for that would be that the wall can be 'for' the chair to encounter" ("beings can only touch beings on hand within the world when they have, by their very nature, the mode of Being of Being-in . . ."; Heidegger, *op. cit.*, p. 55), or that "two points are no farther apart at all from each other . . . than two things because none of these beings can be far apart according to their mode of Being. They only have a present and measurable distance by being far away." ("Only so far as beings are discoverable at all in their being far away for *Dasein* are intramundane beings themselves accessible in relation to other cases of 'being far away' and distances"; ". . . only because *Dasein* is spatial in the sense of removing farness [*Ent-fernung*] and orientation can what is at hand in the surrounding world be encountered in its spatiality"; Heidegger, *ibid.*, pp. 106f. and 110)—when all this is asserted, then the phenomena are robbed of their specific peculiarities and their characteristic qualities. These qualities thus do not appear as proper to the phenomena themselves, but instead as, so to speak, accruing from the lives of human beings, fitting into them, i.e., grounded in the tendencies, interests of their lives; in this connection, see Löwith, *ibid.*, §§12f.  
 10 See Husserl, *Ideen*, I, §35, p. 62; see also §45, p. 84 for the "continuously-harmoniously motivated perceptual series."  
 11 See pp. 50f.  
 12 See Volkelt, *Das ästhetische Bewußtsein* (München, 1920), Part IV, II.  
 13 See the critique of Scheler, instructive for Volkelt's own position, *ibid.*, Part IV, V: "If Scheler's doctrine were to bear up under the critique, then . . . the partition between I and Thou would . . . fall . . . I and Thou would not stand over against one another as two solitary, stubborn points." By the incidental, "psychologically" meant observation that, for the child's ego "an absolutely ego-solitariness does not exist at all," the traditional position is not given up because the question is in which

sense that ego-solitariness does not exist. It must be shown *which sort of being* the child always already is and in which way the child is at a particular time.

14 Scheler, *Wesen und Formen der Sympathie* (Bonn, 1923) C, II [G. W. 7, pp. 228-232].

15 See the analogue of the a priority of space in Heidegger, *op. cit.*, p. 111.

16 On the sense of this "someone or other," see §19.

17 We find here the essential and characteristic difference between a lecture and a discussion; for that reason, a discussion in which the participant is not focused on the other, but rather expresses his point of view in a monologue, gives the impression of chaos.

18 See Löwith, *Das Individuum*, §§20 and 27.

19 Löwith correctly refers with special emphasis in this connection to the phenomenon of "conversation."

20 Dilthey, *Gesammelte Schriften* (Berlin, 1924), Vol. V ["Der Glaube an die Realität Anderer Personen"], pp. 110ff. for our context. —Because the experience of pressure and resistance constitutes our "belief in reality" as much in "inanimate" physical things as in fellow human beings, Dilthey still appeals to the inference by analogy as the logical equivalent of "interlocking apperception-processes" for what is involved in the experience of fellow human beings in their particularity ("this particular class of objects"). The unification of both these motives makes possible a one-dimensional theory of human encounters. In the experience of resistance which forms "the presupposition of each further experience," processes are attached by means of which we attain to a knowledge about the concretely present mind of someone else. We reproduce "what is internal to someone else"; but this is inseparable from "fellow feeling." While our "fellow feeling" arises by "reproducing and reliving" "of events attentively perceived from outside but relived by internal supplementations," we arrive at the "inner structure" of another person, at a "unity of life and will" which we experience in its independence and in the core-quality of its "value-filled existence." On the basis of the *experience* of the independence of another person there arises the *respect* for this independence: we recognize this other person "as a self-goal just as we ourselves are such a goal." But we experience the life-unity of someone else as like and akin to us, as homogeneous with us (which otherwise also certainly cannot be different since we can only acquire and seize upon the "life-unity" of someone else by the "transfer of our own mental living"; see pp. 189f. and 249ff.), and therefore as having solidarity with us. "Closed core realities, akin to our own, bound up with ours in cooperation and solidarity, yet each <being> a seat of its own will that limits us, form our social horizon." Let us disregard everything said before (e.g., let us disregard the appeal to the inference by analogy and the apperception-processes, the "inseparability" of "reproducing what is internal to someone else" from "fellow feeling"; let us further disregard the fact that the traditional concept of the world stands behind Dilthey's theory and even in a sensualistic coloration: "The concept of the object is conditioned by the relation of sense-impressions to what is differentiated from the self and by the connection of these impressions to a whole which, therefore, lies independently over against the self"); let us heed instead just those dimensionally different kinds of being-together of fellow human beings that Dilthey tries to draw up. Just because we stand in a "social relation" with other people, and a "constantly faint interchange of pressure, resistance and demands allow us to feel that we are not alone," not every attitude toward fellow human beings is legitimated in which we wish to understand the "life-unity" in its structure which makes up its "core existence" as *individuum*. Even when we are together at one time with the "same" person in a situation of partner-

ship, in which we perceive his pressure, and another time direct to him the intention to understand, we are nonetheless together with the "same" person in two different dimensions, and we can encounter the "same" person in still different dimensions. This in no way alters the fact that these different kinds of being-together are not founded in one another just because of their dimensional differences; they must be conceived instead as self-sufficient and in their own particular, specific characteristic. It is rather essential for the dimension of partnership that the fellow human being is *not* accessible in it as a "structured life-unity" (see §§19 and 20). —The understanding of the other as "life-unity" also does not necessarily allow "consciousness of kinship and solidarity" to arise. In a specific sense, admittedly not intended by Dilthey, solidarity is rooted in the dimension of community (see §21); but the understanding implicit in and immanent to this dimension does not, again, touch upon the individual "life-unity" (see pp. 134f.) which is also not seized upon in the being together in a "group" (§§26 and 27). In both of these last-mentioned dimensions there is neither respect for the independence of another's individuality as a self-goal, nor is an accompanying demand meaningful in the being-together of this dimension. Rather the demand for recognition and respect for another's independence have their place in certain relations of partnership (see §21), for which reason it is also completely legitimate that Löwith asks about the "autonomy of the one and the other . . ." precisely "within personal relationships" (*op. cit.*, Chapter III). Although Löwith appeals to Dilthey and continues his lines of thought, he grounds the autonomy in question not by recourse to seizing upon the structured "life-unity," but instead by penetrating into the relationship and, in this freely effected retrospect, by recourse to the other as an other of "equal rank." For this reason Löwith's discussions also merge with an interpretation of Kant's doctrine of the autonomy of man.

21 We speak here only of a determinate province of limited relations of subordination, but not of specifically communal ones such as, e.g., the patriarchy.

22 We must mention here the horizontal "knowledge" that, outside of this being together with the master, one is free, i.e., one is his own master. See below, pp. 115f.

23 Above, §14.

24 Whether this concrete situation and role are relevant for an individual as "structured life-unity," in what measure and in what sense they are relevant, depends on which place and what degree the situation in question and the role, as well as their type, occupy in the structure of this "life-unity," in addition to the concrete situation and role they are in the given case.

25 If, in the same situation, one were to say to his partner that he "would do such and such in your place," this would signify that the situation demands a specific comportment, namely, "to do such and such," at the place in which the partner stands in his role assigned him by the situation at this place; it also signifies that the partner, while comporting himself differently, does not completely take in and understand the situation. But it has nothing to do with what I myself confront as person, individual, and "life-unity."

26 See below, pp. 116f.

27 Because we encounter each other in our roles by being together in partnership and, more particularly, in the roles which have already been mutually attuned beforehand, the structure of anticipatory "answering in advance," worked out by Löwith, is at all possible and governs many provinces of this dimension. But for the same reasons this structure is also to be restricted to this, and only this, dimension.

28 See Heidegger, *op. cit.*, §22. The "They" ["*Man*"] which Heidegger introduces in this connection is, however, not a univocal concept but rather a "predication by

analogy" in the sense of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, Book V, Chapter 6, 1016b34, which is differentiated in its particular meaning in accordance with the dimensions of the being together of fellow human beings. Here "They" signifies the "someone or other" in a quite determinate and concrete role (see pp 130f).

29 Löwith, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

30 Löwith, *ibid.*, pp. 19f. "The essentially necessary structure of relationships consists of . . . the fact that the comporting of the *one* is co-determined by the *other*; it is reflexive in co-reflexivity. Disregarding his relationship to another, what one does and allows is incomprehensible since he does and allows, not as an encapsulated *individual*, but rather as a *persona*, i.e., as one who has a "role," namely, the role is *eo ipso* already assigned to him by his relationship to another even when one does not at all speak and act explicitly in the sense of 'we.'"

31 Löwith, *ibid.*, pp. 22f.

32 On this variation, see above, p. 182, note 20.

33 Löwith, *op. cit.*, p. 52; see also §18. —Here we can only call attention to the question about what then would be the ground and root of these "moral qualities" in the individual as a "structured life-unity"—qualities which not only arise and are manifested in being together with others, but to which, constitutively, the view of such a being-together belongs.

34 This oversight is also noticeable in Löwith's analysis of Pirandello's *Così è (se vi pare)*, *ibid.*, §23, where the point of the piece is just not made apparent. The point consists of the fact that outsiders want to explore by interrogation and confrontation three persons "living in a closed world" without those persons being aware that they have to do with a "closed world." In this context, "closed world" signifies that each of the three have a common history by virtue of and motivated by which they stand in a determinate way with respect to one another. Because the outsiders do not appreciate the historicity of the "world of the three," their curiosity scarcely reaches its goal. Although Löwith sees that only regress to the history of the relationship would make these themselves comprehensible, and although he sees it as a weakness of the piece that this history remains in the background, he does not note what it means for the way of being-together of the three in their "closed world," namely, that this being-together is of "historical obviousness." Because their being-together is historically rooted, it is therefore directly characterized as a being-together in the dimension of community (see §23). As such, however, it is of *essence* articulated differently than the dimension of the encounter of "relational" roles attuned to one another. Of course, this difference can only be made distinct in sufficiently detailed analysis.

35 See the examples adduced in note 9, p. 180.

36 Löwith, *op. cit.*, pp. 50ff.

37 See §16, pp. 184ff.

38 See above, p. 26.

39 Dilthey, *Gesammelte Schriften*, Vol. VII; see especially, pp. 207f. The complexity of even contradictory thought-motives is explained by the state of this unfinished fragment (see the "Preface of the Editor," pp. 348ff.).

40 *Ibid.*, pp. 207f. Just this circumstance legitimates for Dilthey (p. 212) the difference between the "elementary" and "higher forms" of understanding. What "being at the door" signifies will be clarified below, pp. 135f.

41 For further aspects of these questions, see the discussions, pp. 115f.

42 See Scheler, *Wesen und Formen der Sympathie*, pp. 7f. [*G. W.* 7, pp. 22f.].

43 The requirements of pp. 14f. are, therefore, sufficiently accomplished.

44 It is always possible to make this turn because the work, just as work, refers to

people in the modes of their participation and, more particularly, in the sense of "co-inclusive" references.

45 Eduard Spranger, "Zur Theorie des Verstehens und zur geisteswissenschaftlichen Psychologie," *Festschrift für Johannes Volkelt* (München, 1918), pp. 379f.

46 In this connection, see Dilthey, *Gesammelte Schriften*, Vol. VII, p. 321; Spranger, *op. cit.*, p. 389: "All understanding presupposes a having understood."

47 Spranger's thesis, "that we only understand the mental [*Seelische*] by the psychical [*Geistige*]," experiences here some concrete support. As "psyche" Spranger designates "the ideal meeting place" of "isolated encapsuled egos" (*op. cit.*, pp. 371 and 398).

48 See Spranger, *ibid.*, pp. 389f.

49 The concrete existence of the "victor at Austerlitz" is obviously not identically the same as the "author of the Napoleonic Code." For the realm under consideration here it holds universally that, if the concrete existence of a person is determined with respect to the situation in which he has a role, then the identity of the "individual" persisting throughout the different roles is, as identity, hardly an unquestioned obviousness, and is a problem in exactly the same sense as that presented above (§14) was for me, namely the problem of being alone in a situation. Because the grounds by virtue of which the problem of identity arises are the same as before, it suffices to refer to the previous section.

50 Dilthey, *Gesammelte Schriften*, Vol. VII, pp. 320f. When Dilthey notes that "deeds happen in the drive of the will in order to bring something about, not in order to communicate something to contemporaries or successors," reference is therefore made to what we emphasized before as the necessity of a *turn* from institutions, works, etc., to the persons who, in certain ways, have a stake in them.

51 See pp. 135f.

52 See §14.

53 What is essentially at issue here also holds precisely for our continuous, daily knowledge about surrounding and fellow worlds in which we live; see above, pp. 101f.

54 We purposively do not say that the realms under discussion are "co-included." "What is co-included" is taken now, without exception, in the sense that the possibility of a continuous progression subsists, guided by material relations and relevancies [*Bewandtnissen*], from what is now present to "what is co-included." This possibility does not exist here at all. For the realms in question it is essential that they lie completely outside the present situation and do not stand in any relevant connection to it. Reference is made only to the realms as realms, not to what is inherent in them.

55 Note 49.

56 On this basis the question must also be raised about the autonomy of fellow human beings in the partnership. The phenomenon explicated in the text provides the proper foundation for this inquiry. We cannot enter further into the matter here.

57 Ferdinand Tönnies, *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* (Berlin, 1926), p. 51. [With some modifications, the translations into English of Tönnies are by Charles P. Loomis, Ferdinand Tönnies, *Community and Society* (New York, 1957), pp. 76f.]

58 Tönnies, *ibid.*, p. 39 [translation, p. 65]. See also Vierkandt, *Gesellschaftslehre* (Stuttgart, 1928), §21, 5: "Contact only takes place along a point or a line (depending on whether the relationship is transitory or enduring)."

59 See Löwith, *op. cit.*, p. 158, note: "The common material association . . . prevents . . . the one coming together in association with the other beyond what is materially required."

- 60 Tönnies, *op. cit.*, p. 4.
- 61 Vierkandt, *op. cit.*, §20, pp. 6f.
- 62 See Schmalenbach, "Die soziologische Kategorie des Bundes," *Dioskuren*, Vol. I (1922), p. 71; see also p. 73, on the placement of "social relationships . . . to something particular determined once and for all. . . . As soon as the business is settled, the individuals withdraw from one another." Otherwise "individual" signifies for Schmalenbach a particular being and does not represent, as it does for us, a "structured life-unity."
- 63 See Dilthey, *Gesammelte Schriften*, Vol. VII, pp. 61f.; Tönnies, *op. cit.*, p. 46 [translation, pp. 71f.].
- 64 See Tönnies, *op. cit.*, III, 1, §7; furthermore, Schmalenbach, *op. cit.*, p. 72: "It is characteristic of society that the relations of which it consists have their principle in the 'Do ut des' . . . The 'contract' has representative meaning here."
- 65 See below, §23.
- 66 For the third sociological category, see below, Chapter Three. According to Vierkandt (*op. cit.*, pp. 233f.), the contrast between "society" and "community" does not exhaust "the totality of all possible social forms" (he does not speak of "groups"), and draws up three "extra-communal fundamental relationships" ("legal or acceptance-relationship," "war relationship," and "power relationship"). In any case, as he himself says, these three "fundamental relationships" fall under Tönnies's concept of "society" if one will only conceive it broadly enough.
- 67 See Vierkandt, *op. cit.*, §XXX, p. 20. See further p. 246: "In the first <scilicet> the personal relationship > those concerned are together in soul and spirit, in the latter <scilicet> the material relationship > they are united only by spirit."
- 68 Gerda Walther, "Zur Ontologie der sozialen Gemeinschaften," *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologischen Forschung*, Bd. VI (1923). Similarly, Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, I, Chapter I, §9 [p. 21]: "'Communalization' is called a social relation when and insofar as the focus of social action . . . rests on the subjectively felt (affective or traditional) *belonging-together* of those involved." On Weber, see Schmalenbach, *op. cit.*, p. 89.
- 69 For the definition of "intentional reciprocity," see Walther, *op. cit.*, p. 22.
- 70 Accordingly, it is only consistent that Walther says (*ibid.*, p. 33) that "All social formations, . . . consociations, institutions, etc., in Weber's sense would be comprised by us under the collective concept of *social* formations so long as this feature is lacking." But precisely what Weber calls "institution" (above all, "church" in contrast to "sect") has the specific characteristic of community. See below, pp. 143.
- 71 Walther, *ibid.*, pp. 29f.
- 72 Schmalenbach, *op. cit.*, pp. 54f. Similarly, Vierkandt, *op. cit.*, pp. 211f., who in the first edition of his book (1923), §25, had still distinguished between "essential community" and "experiential community" ["*Erlebnismgemeinschaft*"] (where what he calls "experiential community" rests upon pure feeling-infection in Scheler's sense, *Wesen und Formen der Sympathie*, pp. 12f. [G. W. 7, pp. 24ff.], and properly presents a togetherness in the pregnant sense): "We can only speak of a community in the case of a communal experience when this experience is received as a concern of the community. So that this experience can enter, however, a community-consciousness must already be present." Because this is "radically different in the 'group,'" for which feeling-processes are constitutive, Schmalenbach arrives at the delimitation of community from group, which he develops as a proper and self-sufficient sociological category. On these grounds we cannot accept the event of "inner unification" described by Walther, *op. cit.*, pp. 34ff., apart from particulari-

- ties of description and its presuppositions (i.e., the traditional account of *originally isolated* subjects), as the emergence of *community*.
- 73 See Tönnies, *op. cit.*, I, §§6, 12f., and 15f. [translation, pp. 42ff., 51ff., and 55ff.].
- 74 See the difference between possession and control in Tönnies, *op. cit.*, III, p. 5 [translation, pp. 183ff.].
- 75 Tönnies, *ibid.*, p. 23 [translation, p. 50].
- 76 Vierkandt, *op. cit.*, p. 251.
- 77 In this connection, see also Tönnies, *op. cit.*, §§19ff. [translation, pp. 64ff.].
- 78 We substantially agree with Walther, *op. cit.*, p. 24, when she asserts that the "intentional life-content in common," which is co-constitutive for the community, can be a "real possession," though it need not be, but also in this case must show some sort of relation to reality, and cannot be absolutely severed from "past, present and future reality." In any case, we wish to avoid the loaded term "reality" especially because that which comes into view outside the "real possession" must be called "real" in a certain sense that cannot be more precisely examined here. With respect to the matter at hand, what Walther designates as "real" is the economic and the tangible. The otherwise still present communal possession has always in fact a determinate, even though different, relation to the economic and tangible.
- 79 Tönnies, *op. cit.*, p. 15 [translation, p. 42].
- 80 We cannot enter here into the problem of the "objective spirit." See the presentation of the problem of the "existence of culture" in Spranger, "Zur Theorie des Verstehens und zur geisteswissenschaftlichen Psychologie," §3, who explicitly sets this existence off from the being of "ideal objects."
- 81 Vierkandt, *op. cit.*, §33; see also pp. 334f. Also belonging to this context are Scheler's discussions of the "relative natural conception of the world"; see *Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft*, pp. 59ff. [G. W. 8, pp. 61ff.].
82. See Spranger, *op. cit.*, pp. 383f.
- 83 See Tönnies, *op. cit.*, pp. 19f. [translation, pp. 41ff.].
- 84 Tönnies refers to this, even though in his discussions of habit and memory (*op. cit.*, Pt. II, §§7ff. [translation, pp. 110ff.]), he calls upon the association of ideas and the corresponding concept of experience and practice. But what is familiar and habitual are ways of thought, courses of action, orders of life, and the like, but never associated ideas, representations, sensations of pleasures and pain.
- 85 One of the articulations of the universal reference to the fellow world, of which we spoke before, lies in this.
- 86 Schmalenbach, *op. cit.*, pp. 41 and 45ff.
- 87 With respect to some of the limiting cases discussed by Schmalenbach, it may be observed that it is the *phenomenological* characteristic of the "at all times" and the "always already" which is of concern, and not the objective space-time to which they are related.
- 88 That there are communities which have not become explicit and of which there has not once been "awareness" is shown by Schmalenbach's reference to linguistic communities, racial communities, and the like; the folk community also belongs here. In any case, under certain circumstances, there cannot only be explicit awareness of these communities; rather, a relationship of the "group" intervenes; see Schmalenbach, *op. cit.*, p. 68.
- 89 See below, §26.
- 90 Tönnies, *op. cit.*, I, §§11f.; Schmalenbach, *op. cit.*, pp. 45f.
- 91 Tönnies, *ibid.*, p. 53 [translation, p. 78].
- 92 *Ibid.*, I, §6 [translation, p. 42; the translation is revised].
- 93 *Ibid.*, I, §§9f. [translation, pp. 47, 49; the translation is revised].

- 94 Schmalenbach, *op. cit.*, pp. 49f.
- 95 Tönnies, *op. cit.*, p. 86 [translation, p. 104]. We cannot enter into this psychological theory of willing; its significance for Tönnies is clear in the observation that "just as the forms of the will, people as a whole comport themselves with respect to one another" (p. 130).
- 96 In primitive relationships the dead also belong to the community and, with the living, form—as Vierkant points out, *op. cit.*, pp. 444f.—"a single family and, at the same time, a single community." See in this connection, L. Lévy-Bruhl, *Les fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures* (Paris, 1928), Chapter VIII.V. The best known example of this is the ancestor worship of the Chinese.
- 97 In this connection, Schmalenbach speaks of a "modification which the spiritual 'ground' in us, the 'unconscious,' has experienced" (*op. cit.*, p. 52).
- 98 See Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, p. 20: "In every case, in its factual Being *Dasein* is how and 'what' it already was. Whether explicitly or not, it is its past. . . . *Dasein* is in its particular ways to be and therefore, with the Being-awareness belonging to it, it also is in a traditional interpretation of *Dasein* and grown up into <that tradition >." We cannot enter here into the constitution of historicity in temporality and the problems of this constitution (*ibid.*, II, Chapters V and VI).
- 99 Scheler, *Wesen und Formen der Sympathie*, pp. 40f. [*G. W.* 7, p. 49]: "We live here in the past—without the act of remembering being co-given, which leads us into the past, and just on that account, without knowing it, it is the past in which we live."—With regard to the existential meaning of the past, one cannot conceive, as Scheler does, the formation of tradition and the transmission of tradition as infection. For it is not a matter here of taking over feeling-states, particular valuations, judgments, etc., which would be a matter of projecting oneself into certain attitudes, world views, ideas of life, and the like. Just because the growing up of the child in the tradition of his parent's home is a determining factor, something essentially different is present where the child co-executes some judgment or other about his surroundings, which only comes into view as a particular judgment and does not derive from the "spirit" ruling his surroundings. Accordingly, everything that we take over by infection is, according to its essence, past and transitory, while the tradition, in which we have grown up, by virtue of itself, has duration and substance [*Bestand*—just as being together in the community has in itself the tendency toward duration.
- 100 See in this connection, Dilthey, *Gesammelte Schriften*, Vol. V, pp. 39ff.
- 101 See Dilthey, *Gesammelte Schriften*, Vol. VII, p. 278.
- 102 Tönnies, *op. cit.*, p. 130.
- 103 *Ibid.*, p. 39. An extreme radicalization of this state of affairs, which has its own structures that cannot be investigated here, is the patriarchal membering of the society in which the sense of being of the particular person is assigned by the whole.
- 104 See pp. 122f.
- 105 Thus Gerda Walther, *op. cit.*, p. 71.
- 106 *Briefwechsel zwischen Wilhelm Dilthey und dem Grafen Paul Yorck von Wartenburg 1877-1897* (Halle, 1923).
- 107 *Ibid.*, p. 71.
- 108 *Ibid.*, p. 167. Accordingly, the observation "that the scientifically adequate mode of presentation would be regressive. Turning back from one's own livingness to what appears past, historical cognition of the force towards preservation would premise an analysis of the present of the past and, therefore, offer at the same time a control for the historical over against the antiquarian." See also in this connection, p. 68: "the epoch of Galileo, Descartes, Hobbes, is virtually present."

- 109 Dilthey, *Gesammelte Schriften*, Vol. II; see particularly the note to p. 519.
- 110 *Briefwechsel*, Letter of 8 June 1892.
- 111 *Ibid.*, p. 193.
- 112 *Ibid.*, p. 26: "The nerves are invisible just as is anything essential whatever."
- 113 *Ibid.*, p. 128.
- 114 *Ibid.*, pp. 133 and 223.
- 115 *Ibid.*, p. 167.
- 116 *Ibid.*, p. 203.
- 117 Dilthey, *Gesammelte Schriften*, Vol. V, p. 249.
- 118 *Briefwechsel*, Letter of 21 October 1895.
- 119 See in this connection, Dilthey, *op. cit.*, p. 114.
- 120 *Briefwechsel*, p. 256.
- 121 Dilthey, *op. cit.*, p. 250; *Briefwechsel*, p. 192.
- 122 See also *Briefwechsel*, Dilthey, Letter of Christmas 1892.
- 123 Thus Tönnies notes, *op. cit.*, p. 195: "Man finds himself born into this <*scl.* the family >; of course, he can remain there, but by no means can he conceive the foundation of that relationship as a consequence of his own voluntary freedom."
- 124 See in this connection, Schmalenbach, *op. cit.*, pp. 53ff.
- 125 Oppenheimer, *System der Soziologie*, I (Jena, 1922), p. 101.
- 126 See Schmalenbach, *op. cit.*, p. 68. That the feeling united as "one" is institutive for the group will be developed in §26.
- 127 Vierkant, *op. cit.*, pp. 144 and 210.
- 128 This interpretation does not signify any weakening or relativizing of the universal and unconditioned bond intended in the morals of the community: it does not mean that, in the sense of these morals, there is a restriction on the members of the community over against "outsiders" who are excluded in advance, although this sort of morals of the community are given. That kind of weakening is not present because the morals involved have their legitimation in the traditional itself: what is handed down, which is always already valid beforehand, is "taken for granted" and therefore is what is right and obligatory in a sense determined by this "being taken for granted."
- 129 Vierkant, *op. cit.*, pp. 372f. and 384f. See also pp. 357f.
- 130 See *ibid.*, §18.
- 131 In contrast, see above (p. 120ff.) where we introduced the working-with-one-another motivated by virtue of the comprehensive life-context.
- 132 In any case, a restriction is to be made here: for the group being formed among members of the community, the community, in which they stand, already in its present determination plays a certain role, especially when the members of the group belong to the same generation. See also below, p. 137ff.
- 133 See above, p. 115f.
- 134 We disregard the case where someone in his individual being and development outgrows his community.
- 135 See above, p. 120f.
- 136 Scheler, *Wesen und Formen der Sympathie*, pp. 9f. [*G. W.* 7, pp. 23f.].
- 137 Schmalenbach, *op. cit.*, pp. 59 and 68.
- 138 Because this latter, as Scheler emphasizes, "presupposes the highest form of love," it is a question here of the group; see also Schmalenbach, *op. cit.*, p. 72: "The friend is 'another ego.' We feel his joy and his sorrow as our 'own' joy and our 'own' sorrow."
- 139 In this connection, see Vierkant, *op. cit.*, §35.
- 140 In this connection, see Dilthey, *Gesammelte Schriften*, Vol. VII, pp. 208ff.

- 141 See, for example, Lévy-Bruhl's critique of animism.
- 142 Spranger, "Zur Theorie des Verstehens und zur geisteswissenschaftliche Psychologie," p. 395; see also Dilthey, *Gesammelte Schriften*, Vol. VII, pp. 141ff. A further confirmation of Spranger's thesis is found in Dilthey, namely that "we only understand the psychical by the spiritual." See also above, pp. 185, note 47.
- 143 "Psychical subject" is understood here precisely in Spranger's sense, *op. cit.*, p. 369, as the subjective correlate of "culture." The problem of "how the psychical subject is entwined into the individual ego" is just the problem of the essential historicalization and communalization of human being.
- 144 See Spranger, *op. cit.*, pp. 389ff.
- 145 See Schmalenbach, *op. cit.*, pp. 59ff.
- 146 See p. 120 and §25.
- 147 The detailed grounding which makes the group salient over against the community is given by Schmalenbach, as a consequence of which we can, in this regard, refer to his discussion as well as to the controversy of Tönnies and Max Weber.
- 148 In the next sections we shall enter into what is essential here insofar as the framework of this essay allows.
- 149 Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, Teil I, Kap. III, §10 [p. 140]; see also Teil III, Kap. IX [pp. 753ff.; 1972, Teil I, Kap. III, pp. 654ff.].
- 150 This "believing in" in the sense of "trusting" is characteristically distinguished from "believing that." See also the suggestion above, p.p. 10f.
- 151 See above, pp. 39ff.
- 152 In this connection, see Scheler, *Wesen und Formen der Sympathie*, pp. 90-112 [*G. W.* 7, pp. 87-104]; furthermore, A II, 4, pp. 16-40 [*G. W.* 7, pp. 29-48]. However, the examples mentioned there do not concern feeling united as "one"; see above, pp. 80ff.; we must still discuss some of the things which Scheler says there.
- 153 Scheler, *Wesen und Formen der Sympathie*, pp. 101f. [*G. W.* 7, pp. 96f.]. If one contrasts this interpretation of ἐνδύειν χριστοῦ [*G. W.* 7, p. 96] with the ἐνδύεσθαι χριστόν of St. Paul in Yorck's thoughts about the "virtual attribution and transfer of force," then the difference between living from historical motives and from emotion geared into feeling united as "one" is shown. Yorck describes the charisma that has become in tradition and, so to speak, historically ingrown, which is unavoidable for every charisma (see also above, §24), while Scheler focuses on the genuine making-an-appearance of the charisma.
- 154 In this connection, see Schmalenbach, *op. cit.*, pp. 61f.
- 155 The "communal bond" ["*Gemeinde*"], which Weber (*op. cit.*, p. 14) defines as "emotional communalization," is a "group" ["*Bund*"] in Schmalenbach's sense.
- 156 See Schmalenbach, *op. cit.*, p. 72.
- 157 See p. 130f.
- 158 Correspondingly, this holds for the "cosmo-vital feeling united as 'one'" described by Scheler, *Wesen und Formen der Sympathie*, pp. 92ff. [*G. W.* 7, pp. 89ff.].
- 159 Vierkant, *op. cit.*, p. 144; see also, p. 210: "... many persons ... feel themselves ... as a unity in a specific way, namely as 'we' which takes the place of 'I' or at least pushes the latter into the background."
- 160 See p.p. 130f., 137f.
- 161 Schmalenbach, *op. cit.*, p. 72.
- 162 See above, p.p. 115f.
- 163 See above, pp. 131f.
- 164 This is tied up with what Weber, *op. cit.*, p. 761 [1972, pp. 660f.], calls "charismatic communism."

- 165 In this connection, see Weber, *op. cit.*, Teil II, Kap. IV [1972, Teil II, Kap. V, pp. 245-381], and Schmalenbach, *op. cit.*, pp. 43ff.
- 166 Max Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie* (Tübingen, 1922), Bd. I, pp. 118ff.
- 167 These definitions of "church" and "sect" were introduced by Weber, *ibid.*, Bd. I, pp. 152f. and 211; see also Schmalenbach, *op. cit.*, p. 44: "Church is a pure group transformed into a sect in a 'community'—or even in a 'society' (both relatively)." In any case, Schmalenbach offers no example of a social "church" [*gesellschaftliche "Kirche"*].
- 168 See above, p.p. 120f.
- 169 Scheler, *Wesen und Formen der Sympathie*, pp. 12ff. [*G. W.* 7, pp. 25ff.]. Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, p. 768 [1972, p. 667], also believes "that all emotional affecting of the masses is, in itself, necessarily a certain 'charismatic' feature."
- 170 See above, p.p. 26f.
- 171 As Vierkant argues, *op. cit.*, pp. 211f., for this reason "a mental process can generate no community by means of itself." Accordingly, we take community, which also includes the group for Vierkant, as representative of an ontic relationship at large among human beings. In any case, as will be further developed, the "same mental process . . ." can "call up an inner approximation of the persons involved," and thus leads to a group (Vierkant says "community"). But then it is not only a question of a mental process common to all; rather this mental process already contains a mutual advertence to those concerned.
- 172 Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, pp. 11f.
- 173 Schmalenbach, *op. cit.*, pp. 89ff.
- 174 Husserl, *Ideen*, I, §32.
- 175 It makes no difference if the experiences are our own or those of someone else; it only matters that they are actually and factually realized once. The possibility is sufficient for phenomenological consideration (see Husserl, *Ideen*, I, §70, on the "pre-eminence of free phantasy"), so that the factual and historical examples present exemplifications of these possibilities.
- 176 Scheler, *Wesen und Formen der Sympathie*, pp. 37ff. [*G. W.* 7, pp. 45ff.].
- 177 *Ibid.*, pp. 120-154 [*G. W.* 7, pp. 111-137].
- 178 See above, pp. 80f.f.
- 179 See Scheler, *Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft*, pp. 160, 352ff., and 460f. [*G. W.* 8, pp. 138, 260f., and 362f.].
- 180 For an example, see Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie*, Bd. I, pp. 97ff.—the example is from Bunyan's "The Pilgrims Progress from this world to that which is to come."
- 181 Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, p. 755 [1972, pp. 656f.]; see also p. 142 on the "economic alienation" of pure charisma.
- 182 See p.p. 143ff.
- 183 Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, p. 755 [1972, pp. 656f.].
- 184 See Schmalenbach, *op. cit.*, pp. 73f.
- 185 See above, p.p. 144f.f.
- 186 Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, pp. 758f. [1972, pp. 657f.].
- 187 Weber, *ibid.*, pp. 141 and 375 [1972, pp. 141 and 188].
- 188 *Ibid.*, pp. 146ff. [1972, pp. 146ff.].
- 189 We can only refer in passing to the fact that the origin of the historically significant phenomenon of secularization has its place here.
- 190 See in this connection, Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, Teil I, Kap. III, §§11ff., and Teil III, Kap. X [1972, Teil I, Kap. III, pp. 657ff.], for more precision.

- 191 Schmalenbach, *op. cit.*, pp. 73ff.  
 192 See Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, pp. 145ff. [1972, pp. 145ff].  
 193 *Ibid.*, p. 762 [1972, pp. 661-662].  
 194 Scheler, *Wesen und Formen der Sympathie*, pp. 17f. [*G. W.* 7, p. 30].  
 195 We use the term "soziiert" ["sociate"] in place of "vergesellschaftet" ["socialize"] in order to avoid misunderstandings that can arise because "Vergesellschaftung" ["socialization"] itself is a manner of "Soziiert-Sein" ["Being-Sociated"].  
 196 Schmalenbach, *op. cit.*, pp. 79ff.  
 197 *Ibid.*, p. 70.  
 198 See Husserl, *Ideen*, I, §§9 and 16.  
 199 Schmalenbach, "Soziologie der Sachverhältnisse," *Jahrbuch für Soziologie*, Bd. III (1927).  
 200 Schmalenbach, *ibid.*, p. 44.  
 201 See Vierkandt, *op. cit.*, §27.  
 202 Heidegger, *op. cit.*, §12.  
 203 Vierkandt also aims at this, *op. cit.*, p. 23, when he says of social dispositions, which he conceives as "innate drives . . . properties, and manners of comportment," that "they presuppose for their exercise the presence of others or, more precisely stated, the state of society."  
 204 See above, p. 190, note 49.  
 205 Löwith, *Das Individuum in der Rolle des Mitmenschen*, p. 54.  
 206 See above, p.p. 120f.f.  
 207 In this connection, we must note that the analyses of §§13ff., also oriented toward this mere dealing and manipulating, not only involve a determined mode of living in the milieu-world, but they develop the structures of the milieu-world itself and the life in it. What was described there is prior to all modal particularizations, grounding them all and containing them all.  
 208 See above, p.p. 95f.

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